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Caring for a patient with rabies: implications of the Milwaukee protocol for 
infection control and public health measures. 
 
T Lampejo, M Bruce, A Teall, M Dall’Antonia, E Crawley-Boevey, P Grant, S 
Polhill, D Pillay, D Brown, M Brown, E Nastouli 
  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We discuss the infection control and public health measures taken whilst managing a 
case of laboratory confirmed rabies and the challenges faced in implementing these 
measures. Case management requires intensive multi-disciplinary coordination. The 
Milwaukee protocol, which to date has 5 reported human rabies survivors associated 
with its use, has been suggested as a potential management pathway for human 
rabies. A consensus among hospital and public health clinicians would aid future 
deployment of this approach in selected cases. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Rabies is a viral illness causing an encephalitis that is almost always fatal. Belonging 
to the Rhabdoviridae and of the Lyssavirus genus, rabies is a significant cause of 
mortality in the developing world. Transmission to humans usually occurs via the 
salivary route as a result of a bite from an infected animal. Dogs account for the 
majority of cases of animal rabies (54%), although bats are increasingly becoming 
the source of human rabies in the United States. In the United Kingdom (UK), rabies 
has been eradicated amongst the terrestrial animal population and therefore recent 
cases of transmission to humans from terrestrial animals have been associated with 
exposure whilst abroad. Bats in the UK, however, do carry lyssaviruses thus posing a 
risk for human rabies acquisition1. European bat lyssavirus type 1 (EBVL-1) is the 
predominant strain circulating amongst bats in Europe2. However, within the UK, only 
cases of EBLV-2 infection have been identified in the bat population2. The 
Daubenton’s bat (Myotis daubentonii) is the only bat species in the UK in which 
EBLV-2 has been isolated2 and in 2002, an unvaccinated bat handler in Scotland 
who did not receive rabies post-exposure prophylaxis, died from a laboratory-
confirmed EBLV-2 infection3. Bat bites are typically less conspicuous than those from 
terrestrial animals and therefore specialist advice should be promptly sought if a bat 
bite is felt by an individual, regardless of whether a skin break is visible and 
irrespective of whether the bat species is known1. 
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The incubation period following exposure to rabies has been reported to be as long 
as 19 years although most individuals will become unwell within 90 days of exposure. 
Initial symptoms are non-specific and include fever, malaise, headache, nausea and 
vomiting. This prodromal period lasts between 2 and 10 days. Subsequently, infected 
individuals develop agitation, delirium, hydrophobia and autonomic dysfunction. 
Ultimately coma and death occur from cerebral oedema or myocarditis. 
 
Early recognition and timely management of exposures protects patients from this 
fatal viral infection. Where this has failed to prevent disease, caring for patients with 
suspected and/or confirmed rabies, a Hazard Group 3 (HG3) pathogen, poses a 
major challenge. Following the survival of a patient4, the Milwaukee protocol has 
been suggested as a potential clinical algorithm. However, a co-ordinated approach 
both between and within relevant organisations is required with early laboratory 
confirmation in order to avoid exposure of others including health care workers. It is 
important that preparation and rehearsal of pre-incident planning takes place and that 
protocols are followed. 
 
We describe the infection control and public health management implications of the 
Milwaukee protocol in a case of rabies. The patient presented to a District General 
Hospital and was subsequently managed in partial concordance with the Milwaukee 
protocol in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) of a London teaching hospital. 
 
 
 
METHODS 
 
Setting 
 
The Queen Elizabeth Hospital located is a District General Hospital in South East 
London and forms part of the Lewisham and Greenwich NHS trust. A consultant 
microbiologist is available 24 hours a day for clinical and infection control advice. 
 
The Hospital for Tropical Diseases (HTD) based at University College London 
Hospitals (UCLH) serves as a tertiary referral centre for infectious diseases. Infection 
doctors encompassing infectious diseases physicians, virologists and microbiologists 
provide a 24-hour consultant-led service for clinical advice and referrals. Over 1300 
patients are admitted under the care of the infectious diseases team each year. The 
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hospital is supported by an infection control team (with microbiology and virology 
support) which provide a 24-hour service. There is also a dedicated occupational 
health department.  For critically ill patients, UCLH hosts a 35 bed Intensive Care 
Unit (ICU). The unit is staffed by a multi-disciplinary team that cares for 
approximately 2,500 patients each year. 
 
In the UK, Public Health England provides 24-hour advice regarding management of 
cases of public health interest. 
 
 
 
Summary of the case 
 
The infectious diseases doctor on-call for the HTD received a call from the 
Emergency department of Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Woolwich referring a 58-year-
old patient with suspected rabies4. Nine weeks prior to her presentation our patient 
had sustained a bite by an ownerless puppy to her right forearm whilst in India. She 
was accepted for transfer to UCLH and admitted directly to the ICU at UCLH the 
same day. Treatment of the patient was principally guided by the Milwaukee protocol 
version 3.1 (which is now in its most updated form as version 5.0)5. The protocol is 
based on induced coma and neurotransmitter substrate replenishment, whilst 
allowing the body’s immune system to clear the virus and aims at rebalancing the 
rabies-induced tetrahyrobiopterin deficiency that leads to dopamine and serotonin 
deficiency and poor nitric oxidase activity6. We were also guided in the infection 
prevention and control aspects of our case management by the current Department 
of Health rabies guidance document7.  Despite the intense multi-disciplinary efforts 
made, her clinical condition progressively deteriorated. She progressed to profound 
autonomic disturbance and died 10 days after admission. Pathak et al have 
published the clinical features, ante- and post-mortem laboratory findings of this 
case4. 
 
RESULTS 
 
INFECTION CONTROL MEASURES 
 
Initial management at the referring hospital 
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A diagnosis of rabies was suspected by the patient’s GP who had a telephone 
discussion with the emergency medicine consultant at Queen Elizabeth Hospital.  
The case was subsequently discussed with the microbiology consultant, who alerted 
Public Health England. Strict infection control precautions were advised and followed.  
The patient was cared for by a small team of charge nurses and consultants in order 
to minimise exposure. There were no direct exposures to the patient’s bodily 
secretions without personal protective equipment as strict contact precautions were 
followed from the outset.  Post exposure vaccination was offered to 6 members of 
staff of Queen Elizabeth Hospital, two of whom completed the full 5 doses course. 
The other 4 staff members opted not to receive the vaccine.  
 
 
The patient and members of staff at UCLH: 
 
The patient was admitted to a single-bed room with en-suite sanitary facilities, a 
lobby and negative pressure ventilation on the ICU. Urine and faeces from the 
patient, although considered non-infectious, were disposed of in an en-suite toilet 
and any residual matter was put in the clinical waste. Prior to intubation the patient 
was drooling and producing a significant amount of salivary secretions which were 
considered infectious. Once intubated, a closed suction catheter system was used for 
removal of tracheal secretions. Suction containers were disposed of in the clinical 
waste and subsequently transported away from the clinical area to undergo 
incineration. Single-use equipment was used as much as possible and discarded in 
the infectious waste stream. Chlorine dioxide-based disinfectant was used to clean 
non-disposable equipment. Chlorine-based disinfectants are effective against the 
rabies virus and thus can be used for chemical disinfection procedures in cases such 
as ours7. Rabies is an enveloped virus with a lipid-containing bilayer thus rendering it 
susceptible to many commonly used disinfectants including iodine preparations, 
quaternary ammonium compounds, detergents and other lipid solvents8. 
 
 
Visitors and staff entering the room were required to wear personal protective 
equipment (PPE) consisting of face masks with integral visors for eye protection, 
gowns and gloves. Standard surgical masks do not provide adequate levels of 
protection against potential mucocutaneous exposure7. The number of people visiting 
the patient was kept to a minimum. Family members were able to visit with pre-
arrangement, wearing PPE as described, one person at a time (with a health care 
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worker present in the room). Family members were not permitted to be in the room 
whilst any procedures were being performed on our patient.  A single domestic 
cleaner, who had been specifically advised on rabies exposure avoidance measures, 
cleaned the room daily again using disposable equipment where possible and 
wearing PPE. Table 1 summarises the principal elements of the Milwaukee protocol 
and the infection control measures taken to minimise risk of transmission. 
 
Following her death, disposable equipment and material (such as window blinds) 
were placed in the clinical infectious waste stream and removed from our patient’s 
ICU room. The remainder of the patient environment (including the en-suite toilet) 
underwent a terminal clean with a chlorine-releasing agent using disposable cloths 
and mops. The body was transferred to a mortuary with appropriate containment 
facilities as per the Health Services Advisory Committee guidance9 for a post-mortem 
to be conducted. In addition to wearing protective clothing, staff-performing post-
mortems on a patient with suspected or confirmed rabies are strongly advised to 
receive vaccination prior to the procedure7. Despite the low risk of rabies 
transmission, bodies of suspected or confirmed rabies patients should not be 
embalmed7. 
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Table 1. Principal elements of the Milwaukee protocol and the infection control measures 
taken 
Principal elements of the Milwaukee protocol Infection control measures taken to minimise transmission risk 
Do not administer rabies vaccine or immunoglobulin to a 
patient with rabies Not Applicable 
Maintain the patient in isolation 
 
Transfer of laboratory-confirmed rabies to a tertiary care 
facility capable of critical care including intracranial pressure 
monitoring 
Patient admitted to a single-bed room with negative pressure 
ventilation and en-suite facilities on the Intensive Care Unit 
and remained in this room throughout her admission 
 
Number of staff and visitors kept to a minimum and all 
required to wear gloves, gowns and face masks with integral 
visors 
Placement of a central venous catheter, urinary catheter & 
nasogastric tube (nasojejunal tube during the period of ileus 
encountered) 
Procedures performed by experienced senior members of 
staff wearing gloves, gowns and face masks with integral 
visors.  
 
Urine and faeces disposed of in en-suite toilet 
Maintain normovolaemia and serum sodium >145 mEq/L 
(aiming to control the salt wasting that occurs) 
Staff member wearing gloves, gowns and a face mask with an 
integral visor whilst inserting the oesophageal probe for 
oesophageal doppler guided sodium and fluid management 
Deep venous thromboembolism prophylaxis Low Molecular Weight Heparin administered by staff member 
wearing gloves, gowns and a face mask with an integral visor 
Aggressive sedation within the first week of hospitalization  
Our patient was anaesthetised within the first 48 hours of 
admission at the point where she became extremely agitated 
and violent 
Ventilate using normal parameters 
Secretions and suction containers disposed of in clinical 
waste.  Closed suction catheter system used to remove 
tracheal secretions 
Twice daily venous (for serum electrolytes) and arterial 
blood sampling 
Performed by a member of staff wearing gloves, gowns and a 
face mask with an integral visor and equipment disposed of in 
the infectious waste stream. The relevant laboratories 
informed and samples transferred via a predesignated 
pathway 
 
Further heightened awareness during the latter stages of the 
patient’s illness as increased likelihood of viraemia 
Daily electrocardiograms to measure P-R interval and 
assess for heart block 
Performed by a member of staff wearing gloves, gowns and a 
face mask with an integral visor using a dedicated 
electrocardiogram machine 
Maintain core body temperature of 35-37 degrees Celsius No extra measures in addition to the infection control precautions already implemented 
Administer the antiviral agent Amantadine (has 
neuroprotective effects) 
No extra measures in addition to the infection control 
precautions already implemented 
Salivary sampling every other day for virological monitoring 
(until 3 consecutive negative results) 
Initial salivary samples collected on day 0 & day 1 for 
diagnostic purposes but then no further samples collected in 
order to minimise exposure and not felt likely to significantly 
alter management in our case 
Cerebrospinal fluid sampling at baseline and then twice 
weekly for chemistry and serology 
Lumbar puncture not performed to minimise exposure and not 
felt likely to significantly alter management in our case 
Daily transcranial Doppler ultrasound (days 4-8 and 12-15 
after hospital admission) to monitor for degree of 
vasospasm & electroencephalogram monitoring 
Performed by staff wearing gloves, gowns and a face mask 
with an integral visor. Non-disposable equipment cleaned with 
chlorine dioxide disinfectant after each use 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging or Computed Tomography in 
the second and third week twice weekly until CSF titres 
stabilize 
Patient not transferred out of isolation. Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging/Computed Tomography not performed to minimise 
exposure and not felt likely to significantly alter management 
in our case 
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The Virology and Occupational Health departments rapidly set up a service for 
advice regarding post exposure prophylaxis (PEP), vaccine and HRIG administration. 
Staff (including laboratory staff) and visitors were advised to report all exposures to 
the ICU and Virology consultants. PEP was considered necessary for all type III 
exposures10,11; (a) mucocutaneous exposure to the patient’s infectious secretions 
and (b) needlestick injuries.  
 
 
No staff members within the Trust or visitors of the patient were deemed to have had 
a type III exposure upon assessment of their individual risks. Fifty-nine staff members 
were identified by the Occupational Health department as being involved in the 
patient’s care and thus potentially having some form of relatively minor exposure in 
terms of risk of transmission. All staff members and visitors including bank/temporary 
staff were given both verbal and written information regarding rabies exposure and 
vaccine administration. As strict infection control precautions including PPE were 
used by all staff members and visitors, no staff or visitors were considered to have 
had a ‘high-risk’ exposure. Nevertheless, all 59 staff members involved were given 
the opportunity to discuss receiving the rabies vaccine and/or any issues relating to 
rabies transmission and PEP. Dedicated occupational health, infection control and 
clinical virology staff were readily available for individual face-to-face discussions 
between 9am and 5pm, and a consultant clinical virologist was available via 
telephone for advice out-of-hours. A total of 17 staff at UCLH opted to receive the 
rabies vaccine; 5 nurses, 8 doctors, 3 other hospital staff and 1 laboratory scientist 
(table 2). They received a total of 5 doses which were administered on days 0, 3, 7, 
14 and 28-30. No staff members or visitors received human rabies immunoglobulin. 
Routine follow up was not planned after completing the rabies vaccination course but 
both vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals were given Occupational Health 
department contact details should any concerns or queries arise at a later stage. 
There have been no known secondary cases of rabies at over 36 months since our 
index rabies case. 
 
 
The Infection Control Team was available throughout to provide further advice where 
required. Tele-conference meetings involving ICU staff, Virology, Infection Control, 
Public Health England and the referring hospital took place at least once a day to 
discuss management of this case including infection control issues. 
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Table 2. Potentially exposed staff members, rabies vaccination history and rabies vaccine 
uptake at University College London Hospitals 
Staff member type Number of 
staff 
members 
Type of exposure Number 
previously 
vaccinated against 
rabies  
Number that 
received rabies 
vaccine (number 
previously 
vaccinated against 
rabies) 
Number that did 
not receive rabies 
vaccine (number 
previously 
vaccinated against 
rabies) 
Nurse 33 Had contact with 
patient but no type III 
exposures 
1 5 (0) 28 (1) 
Doctor 20 Had contact with 
patient but no type III 
exposures 
3 8 (2) 12 (1) 
Health Care 
Assistant 
2 Had contact with 
patient but no type III 
exposures 
0 0 2 (0) 
Domestic team 
member 
1 No physical contact 
with patient and no 
type III exposure 
0 1 (0) 0 
Radiographer 1 Had contact with 
patient but no type III 
exposure 
0 1 (0) 0 
Neurophysiologist 1 Had contact with 
patient but no type III 
exposure 
0 1 (0) 0 
Laboratory scientist 1 Handled specimens 
from patient but no 
type III exposure 
0 1 (0) 0 
Type III exposure defined as (a) mucocutaneous exposure to the patient’s infectious secretions and (b) 
needlestick injuries 
 
 
The UCLH laboratory: 
 
Investigations 
 
The specimens (nuchal skin biopsy, wound biopsy and saliva) obtained on day 1 
were initially received in the UCLH Virology laboratory. After giving prior notification, 
the samples were urgently couriered to the reference laboratory (Veterinary 
Laboratories Agency) in an appropriately labelled and packed secure metal box 
following advice for Transportation of Category A Dangerous Goods12. Table 3 
summarises the precautions taken at UCLH with regards to transporting, processing 
and the disposal of patient specimens collected. 
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Table 3. Infection control measures taken for processing of specimens. This information was 
circulated in the form of a trust rabies case management document to pathology staff critical 
care staff, infection doctors, infection control doctors and nurses  
 
Infection control measures taken with our rabies patient’s specimens 
All specimens 
Prior notification of the laboratory and discussion with a senior member of laboratory staff 
 
Ward staff to contact courier to transport specimens to laboratory 
 
Transported in designated metal high risk containment tin 
 
Taken to the relevant laboratory specimen reception 
 
“High Risk” sticker placed on all specimens at time of booking onto the UCLH laboratory 
system 
 
Standard precautions followed for sample handling within the laboratory 
 
Waste material/specimens retrieved by a designated biomedical scientist, double-bagged and 
autoclaved prior to disposal 
Virology specimens 
Prior discussion with virology consultant 
 
Couriered directly to the reference laboratory  
Microbiology 
specimens Prior discussion with microbiology consultant 
Haematology 
specimens Analysed in a closed system (as normal) 
Biochemistry 
specimens 
Centrifugation of samples in the specimen reception area 
 
Analysed in a closed system (as normal) 
 
 
 
Handling of samples for routine care in Haematology, Biochemistry and Bacteriology 
was discussed with the laboratories involved. As secretions (saliva, tracheal 
aspirates, CSF, urine) may contain the virus, such samples were collected only if 
necessary and with prior arrangement with the laboratories. Processing of routine 
bloods was carried out on automated platforms (blood is considered non-infectious). 
Our patient did not require respiratory investigations. 
 
 
 
Public Health Management  
In accordance with Public Health England’s guidance on management of a 
suspected cases of human rabies, our highly suspected case of rabies required a 
response level 3, consisting of case management input from multiple organisations13. 
Public Health England was notified on suspicion by the referring hospital and daily 
teleconferences were held to provide updates and advice on further management of 
our patient.  
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DISCUSSION 
 
Management of a patient with rabies poses a major challenge and requires a health 
care facility that is able to support the augmented care needs of such a patient. 
Effective communication between healthcare professionals in primary care, 
secondary care and public health is vital. As described, strict infection control 
precautions are needed whilst following the Milwaukee protocol and this requires 
close coordination between several departments and their staff within a hospital.  
 
 
To date, nosocomial transmission has been limited to solid organ and tissue 
transplant recipients14 with no reported acquisition of rabies infection in healthcare 
workers caring for a patient infected with rabies15. There have been 8 documented 
patient deaths associated with receiving corneal transplants from rabies infected 
donors13. Another patient, however, that promptly received the rabies inactivated 
vaccine post-operatively on day one, survived after receiving a corneal transplant 
from a confirmed rabies-infected donor 14,16. A child that died from canine rabies in 
the Democratic of Congo bit two of his relatives whilst unwell17. Both relatives 
received rabies PEP on time and did not develop rabies. In contrast, a patient in 
China died from laboratory-confirmed rabies after broken skin on his hand (covered 
by gauze) came into contact with the blood of his relative that he was helping 
immediately after his relative was bitten by a stray dog18. The patient did not seek 
further medical attention at the time or receive rabies vaccination whereas his relative 
who suffered the dog bite promptly received the rabies vaccine and survived without 
complications. The potential consequences of nosocomial rabies transmission are 
extremely high and its Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) 
classification as a Hazard Group 3 pathogen means that strict precautions are 
required. 
 
As typically occurs in the natural history of human rabies, our patient in the early part 
of her admission was hydrophobic, became extremely agitated and had a violent 
episode prior to being anaesthetised, intubated and ventilated4. Caring for a patient 
during this stage poses a heightened risk and therefore strict precautions must be 
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taken with regards to PPE, infection control and sampling (which should be limited to 
where necessary). 
 
We were guided by the Milwaukee protocol throughout the care of our patient and 
closely followed it particularly where we felt it was likely to alter management. We 
opted not to follow certain parts where we did not think it was likely to have a 
significant impact on the management of the patient thus minimising potential 
healthcare worker exposure. The protocol recommends twice day blood tests 
(particularly for monitoring serum sodium) and arterial blood gases at least twice 
daily. Although our patient had repeated blood sampling, routine blood tests were 
limited to only when considered necessary and an internal investigative/sampling 
protocol was devised for our patient. A decision was made not to obtain serum for 
blood grouping/typing/cross-matching and O negative blood would have been 
administered if transfusion was required. Although blood is thought to be non-
infectious, there have been suggestions that a viraemia may occur at some stage 
during infection with rabies19 and we therefore did not want to put any laboratory staff 
at unnecessary risk.  Collection of salivary specimens every other day (for PCR) and 
twice weekly CSF (for chemistry, serology and neurotransmitters) as stipulated in the 
protocol was also not performed. Outside of the direct patient setting, extensive 
laboratory infection control measures were put into place for collection, transfer and 
testing of salivary, urine, blood and CSF samples. Several specimens had to be 
collected frequently throughout this patient’s hospital admission. This had significant 
implications for the haematology, biochemistry, virology and reference laboratories.  
 
 
Another infection control challenge in managing a patient with rabies is the close 
central nervous system monitoring required. Although not applicable to our case (as 
rabies-specific antibodies were not detected) twice weekly MRI or CT imaging 
following seroconversion in the cerebrospinal fluid is also recommended. This could 
pose even greater difficulties in management of potential future cases and provisions 
would need to be made in advance for this when receiving a patient with possible 
rabies. In our case, we opted not to transfer the patient out of her room to any other 
parts of the hospital. Imaging was limited to portable methods which could be 
performed inside the patient’s room. Daily transcranial doppler ultrasound monitoring 
was required in adopting the protocol primarily to monitor for vasospasm and was 
performed during our patient’s admission although equipment and expertise were not 
requested until day 7 of admission. Portable plain chest radiography was also 
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performed. Certain minimally invasive procedures were deemed necessary despite 
the body fluid potential exposure risk. Insertion of a central venous catheter and an 
oesophageal doppler probe were necessary to monitor and optimise our patient’s 
haemodynamic status. Once our patient progressed to multi-organ failure, venous 
access was also required for veno-venous haemofiltration. Additionally, as life-
threatening arrhythmias are known to occur in patients with rabies, transvenous 
insertion of cardiac pacing wires was deemed necessary.  
 
 
De-isolation is considered possible in the most recent version of the Milwaukee 
protocol, version 5.05, once a patient has detectable serum neutralising antibodies 
(>0.5IU/ml) and salivary RT-PCR is negative on 3 separate occasions. We did not 
address this aspect of infection control given the patient’s demise at day 10.  
 
 
Despite efforts from the outset to minimise the number of staff exposed to our patient 
and her specimens, the complexity of managing a case of rabies and following the 
Milwaukee pathway meant that 59 UCLH staff over the 10-day admission period still 
had some form of exposure albeit low risk in this case. There remains a potential 
theoretical risk of transmission to exposed healthcare workers and therefore we did 
our utmost to ensure timely vaccination of individuals reporting an exposure, who 
opted to receive the vaccine. The criteria for offering vaccination to healthcare 
workers was broad with a low threshold for offering the rabies vaccine. The prompt, 
cautious and highly coordinated approach taken in our case with regards to infection 
control both in the clinical and laboratory setting meant that there were no exposures 
deemed to be significant/type III exposures on risk assessment. Twenty-nine percent 
of healthcare workers received the rabies vaccination and in other previous 
hospitalised rabies cases reported healthcare worker vaccination rates have ranged 
from 2% to 100%20. Comprehensive education and prompt handling of any queries by 
our infection doctors, infection control and occupational health teams with additional 
support from Public Health England meant that the majority (71%) of healthcare 
workers did not receive the rabies vaccine in our case.  Establishing a 24-hour 
vaccine advice and provision service for all potential contacts did however pose a 
significant challenge. There was a significant time commitment from the staff involved 
over the patient’s 10 day hospital admission and further arrangements had to be 
made for the healthcare workers being vaccinated to return to the occupational 
health department on specific days that were in concordance with the recommended 
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vaccine dose administration schedule. Adopting a reassurance and counselling 
strategy with the offer of vaccine only for type III exposure may be a consideration in 
future cases.  
 
 
Widespread uncertainty remains regarding the clinical, laboratory and public health 
infection control implications of following the Milwaukee protocol. We look forward to 
published analysis of outcomes for all cases managed globally with this intervention.  
In the future, we hope for evidence to support a consensus for adopting the protocol 
when caring for certain patients rather than for all human rabies cases. Regardless, 
care for these patients can put healthcare workers at significant risk and therefore 
combined multidisciplinary input for safe care is needed. It is therefore vital to seek 
specialist advice early and liaise with experts daily for diagnosis, management and 
infection prevention strategies when managing a case of human rabies. In addition to 
early specialist advice and daily liaison, pre-incident preparation of clinical, 
laboratory, transport and cleaning protocols and training therein are needed. 
Additional useful guidance for devising local protocols and managing a rabies case 
includes the World Health Organisation European Rabies bulletin21 and the Health 
Protection Scotland guidance on rabies22. 
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